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PALE AND WAN,
COMATOSE MAYBE,
BUT NOT DEAD: A
RESPONSE TO
BLEIMAIER
SANFORD R. SILVERBURG*
The law hath not been dead
though it hath slept ......... William Shakespeare'
The necrology of public international law has been published re-
cently in the pages of this journal.' The judgment as described by
Bleimaier, however, in my opinion is incorrect on two salient points: the
substance of the assertion, and the description of the phenomenon bring-
ing about the condition. The purpose of this essay, hence, is to provide an
alternative explanation to the meaning and significance of a mutually
agreed lamentable condition.
We begin an analysis of Bleimaier's position with his statement that
public international law "deals with relationships between and among
nation states," ' which we submit is too narrow a definition and which
displays little awareness of contemporary political realities. We can agree
with Bleimaier that the law developed into a western, Christian, and "civ-
ilized," political environment. It was in turn sustained, according to
Bleimaier, on the principles of natural, or divinely ordained law, executed
and enforced by sovereign monarchs;' he emphasizes further the quality
* Ph.D. International Relations, The American University, School of International Service,
1973. Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, Catawba College, Salisbury,
North Carolina.
' W. SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, Act II, Scene 2, line 90.
2 Bleimaier, The Demise of Public International Law, 23 CATH. LAW. 79 (1978).
3 Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
4 Bleimaier properly discusses the origins of the law with reference to Hugo de Groot, fol-
lowed by Samuel Puffendorf. The successors of Puffendorf were Christian Wolff and Em-
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of sovereign enforcement. As the political world (as distinct from the
"civilized" world) expaided, it encompassed political forms much differ-
ent from the traditional examples found in the West. There can be little
argument that the history of the changes has indeed been remarkable.
With a universal church and empire there had at first been no require-
ment for the law. Western Christendom was governed by natural law, ca-
non law, the papacy, the Roman civil law, and local custom. Both kings
and local rulers owed allegiance to Pope and Emperor. By the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, however, religious and dynastic wars de-
stroyed the authorities underpinning the then Western political world.
Bleimaier believes that as the political world altered itself, the law, as a
peculiarly western institution, rooted in its historical tradition, necessa-
rily waned and its future fortune linked in an inverse relationship to the
rise of nationalist sentiment among non-western people. 5
It is a tragic loss to the study of comparative law that third world
jurists see their legal thought as diametrically opposed to that of the
West. In addition, it is in some sense also a false notion of superiority on
the part of western jurists to see the development of the law in terms of
Western civilization solely. It is to be remembered that the western Ro-
man ius gentium operated similarly in the Eastern Empire. The contact
was but one source of transmission of legal influence from the East.6
Through the migration of Jews and the expansion of Islamic civilization,
the Near Eastern legal codes7 most certainly found their influence in the
development of western law. The current controversy raised by non-west-
ern jurists may in fact be just one more evolutionary step in the law's
development.'
The simplicity of order in Europe in the Age of Empire, as it is
called, matches the neatness of the natural law basis for world order, both
of which are abandoned with the opening of the international frontier.
merich de Vattel. This school posits an international political system with autonomous
states operating in a state of nature. Vattel instructs that the "Law of Nations is a law of
sovereigns." 3 E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE NATURAL LAW OF
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, ch. 4,
38-39 (1758), (C. Fenwick trans. 1916).
6 Bleimaier, supra note 2, at 80.
6 L. MITTEIS, REICHSRECHT UND VOLKSRECHT IN DEN OSLICHEN PROVINZEN DES ROMISCHEN
KAISERREICHS (1891); Hammurabi and Syrian-Roman Law, 19 JEWISH Q. REV. 606 (1907);
Yaron, Syro-Romans, 1966 IURA 17, 114.
7 See, e.g., the Code of Hammurabi in A. POHL & R. FOLLET, CODEX HAMMURABI (1950), and
the Code of Eshnunna in ANCIENT TEXTS RELATING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT 161-63 (J.
Pritchard ed. A. Goetze trans. 1955).
' For the idea of paradigmatic, cultural evolutionary development of the law see Jackson,
Evolution and Foreign Influence in Ancient Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 372 (1968). For a
debate on the issue see Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD.
L. REV. 1 (1974); Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L.Q. REV. 79 (1976).
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What has remained in the interim has been described by Jospeh Kunz as
"a period of transition from 'classic' law of nations which is definitely
gone to some 'new' international law which has not arrived."
The development of the law is characterized by Bleimaier in idyllic
form as a period "where individual sovereigns took -for granted each
other's basic rights and royal prerogatives." 10 The contemporary world,
on the other hand, is contrasted as one in which competitive ideologies,
symbolizing coalitions of states, are combative to the extent that they
seek each other's total destruction."
The post-World War II era, furthermore, according to Bleimaier, has
been marked by a radicalized lack of acceptance of western-initiated
treaty law and laws of war. With regard to the development of treaty law
in the contemporary period the influence of newly independent members
of the Third World is clearly reflected. It was in the process for conclud-
ing the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties 2 that the judicial in-
sight of the Third World was made manifest.13 The evidence for the ab-
sence of law is the occurrence of armed conflict with greater frequency. 4
Frequency of conflict is but one factor of relevance to take into considera-
tion in relating war to world order. The contemporary experience of war-
fare is one of a limited nature in terms of the goals of the belligerents as
well as the geographical extent. The most recent addition to the Geneva
Conventions may in fact prefigure the Third World's intentional use or
support of guerrilla warfare."'
9 Kunz, The Changing Science of International Law, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 488, 488 (1962).
10 Bleimaier, supra note 2, at 81.
" See, e.g., Wilk, International Law and Ideological Realignment: Universality Reexam-
ined, 10 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 463 (1978); Schacter, New Directions in International
Law, 49 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13 (1972).
"2 Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 39/27 (1969).
13 For a discussion of Afro-Asian jurisprudence in the United Nations' Sixth Committee and
the International Law Commission see Abi-Saab, The Third World and the Future of the
International Legal Order, 29 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 27 (1973);
Bedjaoui, LE REGLEMENT PACIFIQUE DES DIFFERENDS AFRICAINS, 18 ANNUAIRE FRANCAISE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 85 (1972); Fahmi, Preemptory Norms as General Rules of Interna-
tional Law, 22 6STERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 383 (1972); Wilson,
A Decade of Legal Consultation: Asian-African Collaboration, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 1011
(1967).
14 Eckart & Azar, Major World Conflicts and Interventions, 1945 to 1975, 5 INT'L INTERAC-
TIONs 75 (1978).
" Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), adopted at Geneva, June
8, 1977. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted at
Geneva, June 8, 1977. Both Protocols are open for signature by the parties to the 1949
Conventions six months after the signing of the Final Act by the Participants of the Confer-
ence, and will remain open for a period of twelve months. Both are also open for accession
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Bleimaier errs still when he identifies an increased interest in inter-
national economics with proof for the growing awareness of private inter-
national law; rather, it is the changing nature of political power centering
on economic interdependency. Indeed, contemporary theories of power no
longer are bounded by the traditional confines of evidenced massive
strength. Certainly, the war in Vietnam and the Arab oil embargo of
1973-1974 have done' much to show the world that actual power may be
more in fact economic self-sufficiency.
At the heart of Bleimaier's misunderstanding is an uncompromising
position opposed to adaptation, adhering to a philosophy of natural law
while at the same time rebuking the positivist approach to world order.
Adherence to a particular value system and set of principles in itself is an
admirable quality but rewarded only by the theorist's appreciation of the
position advanced or by the reemergence of those symptomatic character-
istics at some undetermined future date. Bleimaier would have us believe
- that sovereigns, representing the basic politico-legal units and without
the opportunity f6r a mutually agreed forum for conflict resolution, relied
upon their own self-interest to abide by consensus during the Middle
Ages. The condition has less to do with morality than it does with ration-
ality and self-serving interests which must ultimately determine the ex-
tent of adherence to agreement. One need only return to the classic words
of Thomas Hobbes, a natural law theorist himself, whose seminal
thoughts set down in 1651 aptly apply today: "[C]ovenants, being but
words and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect
any man but what it has from the public Sword .... "16 A couple of
classic examples are also offered to show the despair and frailty of the
medieval world order to which Bleimaier alludes. It was in the latter part
of the fourteenth century that Philip de Mezeires attempted to bring
about Anglo-French detente by organizing a crusade against the Turks
and thus to restore the unity of the Church."7 The move was marked by
anything but common agreement or even success. Similarly, violence was
pervasive enough in European society to cause the Church hierarchy to
create peace associations, but conflict over proper authority for the main-
tenance of law and order continued to arise.18
Traditionally, rules and laws are societal implements to impress upon
its members the means to provide for order. But lacking in any significant
degree in the world is enforcement, as Bleimaier's argument implies,
which is still another indicator of the law's decline. Here we return to the
by any party to the Convention which has not signed the 1949 Conventions.
16 T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 145 (Library of Liberal Arts ed. 1958).
17 See generally IORGA, PHILLIPPE DE MEZIERES, 1327-1405, ET LA CRUISADE Au XIV SIECLE
(1896).
-s See M. BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 408-20 (1971).
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standard touchstone of debate that order precedes law without which the
latter does not exist. This elementary argument is then augmented by
other critics of the law who decry the lack of enforcement."0 It is often
heard, accordingly, that there is no such thing as international law or, as
some would have it, universal law (with an emphasis on law in either
case). To this, the response must be that although at any given time and
place there are criminal acts for which no offender was apprehended, the
responsible legal instrument is certainly not vitiated.
Enforcement has been the essential element of a state centric system
with the monarch at the head of the only recognized political unit. Orders
flowed downward and respect for each sovereign was assumed in order to
maintain stability. A recognition of the change that has occurred in the
international political system is to be found in the classical positivist
tract, Oppenheim's International Law: A Treatise.'0 For Oppenheim,
there has been a fundamental change in terms of the thrust of the law,
from enforcement to consent, thus replacing a factor essential to the
binding nature of traditional rules of international law.21
Concepts of normative22 and "alternative'2 world orders have been
developed by a number of specialists. Moreover, as the future becomes a
subject of concern, the study of the law has come under review to deter-
mine its contributory role.'4 It is not difficult to appreciate then, that the
observer schooled in one frame of mind at one period of time when the
individual reigned supreme can in some instances fail to appreciate legal
developments and nuances in a later age of technology in which real or
19 See, e.g., J. BRIERLY, T H E OUTrLOOK F 0 R INTERNATIONAL LAW (1974); G.
SCHWARTZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER (1971); R. JENKS, A NEW WORLD OF
LAW? (1969); Coplin, International Law and Assumptions About the State System, 1968
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 15.
20 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955).
" Id. at 1-23.
sSee BEDJAOuI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); WORLD FAITHS
AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER: A MUSLIM-JEWISH-CHRISTIAN SEARCH BEGINS (J. Gremillion &
W. Ryan eds. 1978). See also Hicks, International Order and Article 38(1) of the Statute of
International Court of Justice, 2 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 9 (1978). A view from a real-
politik perspective can be found in Almond, The Struggle for a World Legal Order: An
Overview of an Adversary Process, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1977).
23 L. BROWN, WORLD WITHOUT BORDERS (1972); DAMMANN, THE FUTURE IN OUR HANDS
(1979); R. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS (1975); TINBERGEN, RESHAPING THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ORDER: A REPORT TO THE CLUB OF ROME (1976).
" See, e.g., Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Propos-
als, 84 YALE L.J. 969 (1975); Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary International
Law-Gaps in Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. REV. 231 (1964); Finnegan, Three Models of Sci-
ence in the Study of International Law, 8 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 272 (1978); Fitzmaurice, The
Future of International Law and of the International Legal System in the Circumstances
of Today, 5 INT'L REL. 743 (1975); Jenks, Orthodoxy and Innovation in the Law of Nations,
57 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 215 (1971).
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clock time tends to operate exponentially rather than lineally.25 The fail-
ure of the European Metropoles to maintain their colossuses and the
commensurate emergence of new, non-western, and non-Christian states
challenge the established order and the institutions of law itself. Impa-
tience, compelling domestic needs, and an ever increasing economic gap
between the industrialized and developing world" have brought about
conditions deplorable to those whose professional rearing was conducted
under the long term shadow of Grotius, Puffendorf, Vitoria, Suarez, and
Gentilli. The nation-state system emerged to fulfill certain functions at a
particular time and place. But no single principle can be expected to sup-
port any social institution beyond the circumstances for which it arose;
changing circumstances require changing principles, i.e., clausula rebus
sic stantibus.
Instead, we find a web of interlocking principles all of which are rear-
ranged as the need for the institution is molded by those who are af-
fected. So while it might seem to someone rooted in the thought devel-
oped during an earlier age that the law has succumbed to devious forces,
we would agree but at the same time help them to adjust to a new style of
reality. The state-centric system was founded on the basis of certain as-
sumptions which when altered sufficiently-and this appears to be the
case by the middle of the nineteenth century in Europe alone-the forms
of political organization were bound to change. For a consideration of the
rest of the world we must realize that the nation-state, as the embodi-
ment of a territorial principle, was superimposed along with its socio-cul-
tural underpinnings by imperial considerations or by the weight of intel-
lectual appeal on non-western people.
The confluence of many factors that brought about a more interde-
pendent system also gave rise to new forms of global political organiza-
tions." It is safe to say that there is no devolutionary retreat to previous
global configurations in the offing; instead the trend toward greater en-
tho-national pluralism is gaining recognition. This democratization pro-
cess among the world's peoples has had the effect of seriously challenging
the once politically powerful western metropole dominance. Under the ru-
bric of "national self-determination," ethnic groupings around the globe
are demanding parity with the established powers. The inherently disas-
25 Lienhard, The Rate of Technological Improvement Before and After 1830's, 20 TECH. &
CULT. 515 (1979).
25 The listing of national capital assets held by the world's top 50 banks is an obvious exam-
ple of the gap in holdings, see FORTUNE, Aug. 1976, at 231.
17 See, e.g., Huntington, Transnational Organizations in World Policies, 25 WORLD POL.
333 (1973); Lindbeck, The Changing Role of the Nation State, 28 KYKLOS 23 (1975); Singer
& Wallace, Intergovernmental Organizations in the Global System, 1815-1964: A Quantita-
tive Description, 24 INT'L ORG. 277 (1970).
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trous potential of this development is recognized by some.2" This devel-
opment, however, may also be nothing more than a rear guard action by
those who are not so motivated by the "revolution of rising expectations"
that has seized the imagination of many in the lesser developed areas of
the world. Nor can we avoid coming to grips with the growing phenome-
non of the national liberation movement. Here is a situation where organ-
ized guerrilla warfare serves as an instrument for legitimizing and mask-
ing terrorism in lieu of the ability to bring about structured governmental
change. 9 The Third World's litany of damnation also includes years of
foreign control over natural resources leading them to the nationalization
of their domestic industries and natural resources.30 In this connection,
the call for a New International Economic Order s ' by the world's develop-
ing states and the accompanying Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States,32 are sure to provide greater substance to Bleimaier's fears.
If there has been a reorientation of public international law resulting
in the deprivation somewhat of the once all-powerful Western States of
their dominant position, there also have been some changes introduced to
benefit mankind. (And there has also been a commensurate emergence of
regional bodies for the codification of the law, i.e., the Asian-African Le-
gal Consultive Committee and the Inter-American Juridical Committee.)
There has been, for example, the Charter of the United Nations" and
the Declaration of Human Rights"' merely to cite the most glaring.
Bleimaier's emphasis on trade and private international law is a confu-
sion with the regulating effect that the law is concerned with in regards to
inter-state or even transnational economic and trade activity. There is,
28 See, e.g., Silverburg, In Perpetuation of Myth: National Self-Determination de Lege
Ferenda, 2 GLENDALE L. REV. 273 (1978).
"s See, e.g., Abi-Saab, Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War, 3 ANNALES
D'ETUDES INTERNATIONALES 93 (1972). But see Dinstein, The New Geneva Protocols, 33 Y.B.
WORLD AFF. 265 (1979); Silverburg, Sanctuary and Irregular Warfare: Contortive Interna-
tional Law, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L. (1980).
30 See The Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803,
17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). The United States Supreme
Court has recognized that there is no specific rule of law limiting the state's power to expro-
priate alien property. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See also
The First Hickenlooper Amendment, § 301(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, Pub. L.
No. 88-205, 77 Stat. 386 (1963), as amended by 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1976).
31 G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 6th Special Sess. 3, U.N. Doc A/9559 (1974).
The first case attempting to cite the new International Economic Order as customary inter-
national law is Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/ Libyan Arab Republic, Award on the
Merits, Findings No. 83, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1978).
G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N.GAOR, Supp. (No. 12) 50, U.N. Doc. A/212 (1974).
U.N. CHARTER, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71-77 (1948).
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therefore, hesitation to mention the International Monetary Fund,35 the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs,3 6 or the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, 37 all efforts to introduce global eco-
nomic stability.
The emphasis on economic development in the law can be stated to
have begun in December 1961 when the United- Nations General Assem-
bly declared the decade of the 1960's as the first U.N. Development Dec-
ade." As part of the program the Assembly pased a resolution which
called for "International Trade as the primary instrument for Economic
Development." 9 The next session of the Assembly resulted in the accept-
ance of a resolution from the United Nations Economic and Social Coun-
cil (ECOSOC) 0 in order to convene a United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) early in 1964.41 Thus UNCTAD was
established as a permanent subsidiary organ of the Assembly.
The convening of UNCTAD was a milestone in the creation of a new
international political context. Conflict ceased being considered primarily
in ideological terms, pitting East against West. Now emerging was an eco-
nomically based and oriented confrontation state between the North (in-
dustrialized regions) and South (developing areas). At the Sixth Special
Session of the United Nations a new phrase was articulated which epito-
mized the changing character of international politics: a New Interna-
tional Economic Order (NIEO). 42 Similar feelings and policies have also
been evidenced on a regional and subregional scale, as evinced by the
Latin American Free Trade Association 4  and the Andean Group
(ANCOM),'4 respectively.
It becomes incumbent upon the publicists of the law as well as states
" Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
" Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
31 Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Dec. 14,
1960, T.I.A.S. No. 4891, 12 U.S.T. 1728.
G.A. Res. 1710, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 17, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
G.A. Res. 1707, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 14, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
34 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. (No. 1) 7, U.N. Doc. E/3671 (1962).
G.A. Res. 1785, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 14, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
42 United Nations Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Or-
der, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 6th Special Sess. 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974). See generally On the Creation of a New International Economic Order: Issue
Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly, 30 INT'L ORG. 309
(1976).
" The Latin American Free Trade Association was created by the Treaty of Montevideo,
signed Feb. 18, 1960, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 12/AC. 45/3 (1960).
" The Andean Foreign Investment Code, formerly entitled Common Regime of Treatment
of Foreign Capital, and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties, was created by the
effect of the Cartegena Agreement. Agreement of Cartegena, May 26, 1969, signed in
Bogata, Columbia, in force Oct. 16, 1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L MATERIALS 910 (1969).
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who cfeate custom to serve each other in making all those affected by the
changes aware, not only of the substance but also of the context. Reac-
tion and adaptation in an evolutionary manner will more than likely in-
sure the continued effectiveness of the law.
